Missouri Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 3 Summer 1989

Article 7

Summer 1989

Missouri's Hearsay Exception Statute for Victims of Child Sexual
Abuse: Upheld by the Missouri Supreme Court
Thomas P. Dvorak

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas P. Dvorak, Missouri's Hearsay Exception Statute for Victims of Child Sexual Abuse: Upheld by the
Missouri Supreme Court, 54 MO. L. REV. (1989)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Dvorak: Dvorak: Missouri's Hearsay Exception Statute

NOTES

MISSOURI'S HEARSAY EXCEPTION

STATUTE FOR VICTIMS OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE: UPHELD BY THE

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

State v. Wright'

In State v. Wright, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 1985 Missouri statute which enacted a new exception to
the hearsay rule allowing as evidence the hearsay statements of young
children who are alleged to be victims of sexual abuse. This note will
examine the effect of the statute on the prosecution of alleged child molesters
as well as the Constitutional questions posed by the statute and faced by
the court in Wright. Initially, however, this Note will examine the extent
of the child sex abuse problem and the difficulties often encountered in
the prosecution of sex abuse cases.
TIE

EXTENT OF THE SEX ABUSE

PROBLEM AND DiFFicuLTIs iN

PROSECUTION

The sexual abuse of children, along with the broader category of physical
and emotional child abuse generally, is a topic of growing social concern
in the United States. The scope of the problem is large; estimates of the
incidence of sexual abuse of children range from 250,0002 victims to as

1. State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1988).

2. S. O'BRIMN, CHILD ABUSE: A CRYING SHAhM 15 (1980).
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many as 35 million victims annually.3 Studies indicate that one in every
four females will experience some form of sexual abuse by the time she
reaches age eighteen. 4 The full extent of the problem remains difficult to
measure. One commentator has pointed out that "by its very nature, sexual
abuse is a problem that is concealed. Gathering statistics about it is a
frustrating and precarious undertaking. So the cases actually uncovered
may represent only a tip of an unfathomable iceberg." 5
However extensive the problem, there has been a growing public rec6 Consequently, many
ognition that something should be done about it.
state governments as well as the federal government have begun programs
to educate government officials, teachers, and the public about child abuseincluding sexual abuse-and have attempted to foster attitudes which encourage reporting of suspected cases.7 Perhaps as a result of these efforts,

3. Cerkovnik, The Sexual Abuse of Children: Myths, Research, and Policy

Implications, 89 DIcK. L. REv. 691, 695 (1985) ("5 to 35 million victims each
year"); see also, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES, 162, table 277 (1987) (Indicates the number of reported cases of sexual

maltreatment of children in the U.S. has increased from 3.2 cases per 1000 children
in 1976 to 13.3 cases per 1000 children in 1984); EXTENSION

DIVISIoN, UNIVERSITY
OF MIssouRI, MIssouRI CmD ABUSE INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, 57 (R. Ruddle, ed.

1981) (48,412 cases of child abuse reported in Missouri in 1979. Ten percent of
these were sexual abuse); MissouRI DrvisIoN OF FAMLY SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT

'81-'82, at 77 (1983) (The Missouri Division of Family Services maintains a Child
Abuse Hotline which received 33,606 calls in fiscal year 1982); Arnold, Needs of
Children, 42 J. Mo. BARt 77 (1985) (The DFS Child Abuse Hotline continues to
receive in the neighborhood of 40,000 calls annually). For a work on sexual abuse
of children generally, see F. RUSH, THE BEST

KEPT

SECR.ET, SExuAL ABUSE OF

(1980). For an excellent source guide to materials on the sexual abuse
of children, see OFFICE oF HumN DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
ANHUMAN SERVICES, LrrERATURE REvmw OF SExuAL ABUSE (D. DePanfilis 1986).
4. S.O'BRmN, supra note 2, at 15.
5. Finkelhor, How Widespread is Child Sexual Abuse?, in U.S. DEPT. OF
CHILDREN

HEALTH

AND HUMAN

SERVICES, PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD MALTREATMENT IN THE

Mm-'80s, 24 (1984).
6. This attitude either stems from or is reflected in the large number of
stories concerning child abuse which have flooded the media in recent years. The
publicity surrounding the celebrated McMartin preschool child sex abuse case in
California is only one example but one in which publicity has been particularly
intense. See, e.g., Gest, Can the Abused Kids Be Believed?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, July 27, 1987, at 10; Hackett, Child Abuse or Adult Paranoia,NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 15, 1986, at 43; Reese, A Child-Abuse Case Implodes, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27,
1986, at 26; The Youngest Witnesses, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1985, at 72, 73; Los
Angeles Daily Journal, Jan. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06 (1982) (The Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act establishes the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect to serve
as a research facility and information clearinghouse on matters related to child
abuse and to assist local agencies by providing them with the necessary technical
information needed for the establishment of programs to prevent and treat child
abuse). See also Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 210.110-.189 (1986) (Missouri Child Abuse
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/7
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prosecutors have encountered an ever-increasing number of child sex abuse
cases in recent years.'
Sexual abuse of children is rarely accompanied by beatings or other
violence and, frequently, enough time has passed between the abuse and
its reporting for any physical evidence to dissipate. Consequently, the
testimony of the child victim may be the only evidence available. 9 Under
these circumstances, the prosecutor is forced to rely almost entirely on the
testimony of a child-in many cases a very young child-to obtain a

conviction.
Testimony by the child victim raises several substantial difficulties for

prosecutors. Obstacles such as the long-standing presumption against the
competency of child witnesses and the difficulty, under traditional hearsay
rules, of admitting the child's out-of-court statements concerning the abuse
often place the prosecutor in a difficult position.'0 In addition, the child

may accurately describe the abusive event under comforting circumstances
prior to trial, but may refuse or be unable to do so in court when confronted
by the defendant and a courtroom filled with threatening strangers." Further, prosecutors in child sex abuse cases must also be cognizant of the
child's welfare. The act of testifying may be so traumatic for the child
that it constitutes a continuation of the abuse.'2 Parents and prosecutors

Reporting Statute); Krause, Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Legislation in
Missouri 42 Mo. L. tEv. 207 (1977). The state of Missouri also operates a 24hour toll-free Child Abuse Hotline to facilitate reports by individuals with a statutory
reporting mandate as well as by the general public. Missouxu DivisioN oF FAmmy
SERvIcEs, ANNUAL REPORT '81-'82, at 77 (1983).
8. Under Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.145 (1986) (part of the Missouri Child
Abuse Reporting Statute), state officials are required to notify law enforcement
officials and prosecutors upon receipt of child abuse reports. The actual number
of cases referred to prosecutors is unknown, but the child abuse hotline described
supra notes 3 and 7 receives in excess of 30,000 calls per year.
9. V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CrmD 9 (4th ed. 1979); Comment, A
Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83
CoLtmi. L. REv. 1745 (1983). ("The crimes committed are predominantly nonviolent
in nature and almost always occur in secrecy with the child usually being the only
witness.") Id. For a general treatment of the indicia of child abuse, see Myers
and Carter, Proof of Physical Child Abuse, 53 Mo. L. REv. 189 (1988).
10. For a discussion of the competency of child witnesses, see generally,
Goodman, Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, 40 J. oF Soc. IssuEs
9 (1984), and Comment, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of
Sexual Abuse: Must We Abandon It?, 40 MmAm L. REv. 245 (1985).
11. See generally Mahady-Smith, The Young Victim as Witness for the
Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse? 89 DIcK. L. REv. 721 (1985).
12. Mahady-Smith, supra note 11, at 732. See also, Parker, The Rights of
Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?,17 NEw ENG. L. REv.
643 (1982). The seminal article on the protection of child witnesses is Libai, The
Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice -System,
15 WAYNE L. REv. 977 (1977) (Libai proposes a special "child courtroom" which
separates the child victim from the jury and the perpetrator by one-way glass.
Published
by University
of Missouri
School
of LawinScholarship
Repository,
the literature
as a 1989
"Libai courtroom.")
Such
a courtroom
is now
known
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alike often have to balance the continuing traumatic effects of a court
appearance against the goal of convicting guilty defendants. 3 Finally, even
if the prosecutor can overcome these difficulties, the4 testimony of a very
young child may simply be disbelieved by the jury.'

The context within which many child sexual abuse cases arise also
presents difficulties. The offender is often a close relative or friend of the
family. 5 In many cases, the child may be reluctant to testify against such
a person or, as is common in incest cases, may even be under pressure
from other family members not to do so. 16 When the accusation of sexual
abuse occurs in the context of a divorce proceeding or as a result of
visitation under a child custody order, it raises special credibility concernsone parent may encourage the child's testimony of abuse by the other

parent in order to gain custody or deny visitation rights. 7
As a result of these difficulties, the conviction rate in cases of child
sexual abuse has been low.' Consequently, many states have responded
with statutory reforms designed to ease the burden of the prosecution of
such cases and to reduce the level of stress placed on the young victims.
These reforms have typically taken three forms: first, statutes which remove
the presumption against competency for children alleged to be victims of
sexual abuse' 9; second, statutes which create a new exception to the hearsay

13. Mahady-Smith, supra note 11, at 748. See also, Berliner and Barbieri,
The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 125,
128 (1984).
14. Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions for
Research and Legal Practice, 40 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 157, 170 (1984). For studies

concerning the credibility of child testimony, see generally Berliner and Barbieri,
The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. oF Soc. IssuEs 125
(1984); Goodman, Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, 40 J. OF Soc.

IssuEs 9 (1984); and Marin, Holmes, Guth, and Kovac, The Potential of Children
as Eyewitnesses, 3 L. Aim HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979).
15. Typically, the assault is made by "a known and trusted adult, who
use[s] indirect or nonviolent means of coercion to involve [the child] in repeated
sexual activity." Berliner and Barbieri, supra note 13, at 128. "Approximately 70
percent of abusers are well known by their victims." Cerkovnik, supra note 3, at
694. See also, Schultz, The Child Sex Victim: Social, Psychological, and Legal
Perspectives, 52 CHiLD WELFARE 147, 148-9 (1973), and C. GUBERAN AND M.
WOLFE, No SAFE PLACE: VIOLENCE AGAINsT WOMEN AND CHILDREN 88 (1985).
16. Cerkovnik, supra note 3, at 704. See also, GUBERM[AN AND WOLFE, supra
note 15, at 95-99.
17. Comment, supra note 10, at 247 n.6.

18.

"[A]II too often the offender cannot be prosecuted because the principal

witness, the child victim, is unable to testify under current rules of evidence."
McGrath and Clemens, The Child Victim in Sexual Abuse Cases, 46 MONT. L.
REV. 229, 243 (1985).
19. Such a competency statute has been enacted in Missouri. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 491.060(2) (Supp. 1988). Approximately twenty other states have similar
provisions. See, e.g., Arizona, Almz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2202 (1982); Arkansas,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/7
Ani. R. EviD. 601; Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-90-106(l)(b) (1988); Con-
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rule allowing as evidence the out-of-court statements of child sex abuse
victims; 2° and finally, statutes which allow the child victim's testimony to

be videotaped in order to reduce the number of traumatic court appearances. 2' Missouri adopted all three of these reforms in a comprehensive
1985 act which dealt with the question of child abuse generally.Y

necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86h (West Supp. 1988); Delaware, DEL. R.
Evm. 601; Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.601 (West 1979); Maine, ME. R. Evm.
601; Maryland, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
sissippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-3 (1972); Nebraska,

(1985); New Mexico, N.M. R. Evir.

§ 9-103 (Supp. 1986); MisNEB. REv. STAT. § 27-601

601; North Dakota, N.D. R. Evm. 601;

Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 12-2601 (West 1980); Oregon, OR. REv.

§ 40.310 (1985); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5911 (Purdon
1982); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-101 (Supp. 1986); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 74-24-2 (Supp. 1986); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.050
STAT.

(1963); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 906.01 (West 1975); Wyoming, Wyo. R.

Evm. 601.
20. The Missouri hearsay exception is found in Mo. REv.
(1986). Other states with hearsay exception statutes are: Alaska,

STAT. § 491.075
ALASKA STAT. §

12.40.110 (Supp. 1986); Arizona, Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (Supp. West
1987); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule
803(23)(A) (1987); California, CAL. EviD. CODE ANN. § 1228 (West Supp. 1988)

(Allows hearsay only in situations where the defendant has confessed and no other
evidence is available); Colorado, CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1988); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.083(23) (Supp. 1988); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §
115-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6- (Burns
1985); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1983); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02(3) (West 1988); New York, N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT LAW § 1046(a)(vi)
(McKinney 1988); South Dakota, S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987);
Texas, TExAs FAm. CODE §54.031 (Vernon 1975); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-

5-411 (Supp. 1988); Vermont,

VT. STAT. ANN., VT.

R. Evm. 804(a) (Supp. 1988);

Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 9A § 44.120 (1988).
21. Missouri's videotaping law is the "Child Victim Witness Protection Law,"
Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.675-.705 (Supp. 1988). The following list of other states
having such videotaping laws is taken from Comment, Abandoning Trial By Ordeal:
Missouri's New Videotaping Statute, 51 Mo. L. REv. 515, 518 (1986): Alabama,
ALA. CODE § 15-25-2; Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); Arizona, Aiuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1985); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987);
California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1986); Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-413 (1988); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West
Supp. 1988); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (Supp. 1985); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1986); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1205 (Supp. 1986); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1977); Nevada,
NEv. REv. STAT. § 1423 (1985); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(a)
(1985); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984); New York, N.Y. Cams.
PROC. LAW § 190.32 (McKinney Supp. 1986); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-37-13.1 (Supp. 1986); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9
(Supp. 1986); Texas, TEx. CPIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1986);

Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1986); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN.,
VT.

R. Evin. 807; Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7) (West Supp. 1986).
22. 1985 Mo. LAWS 605, 624-5 and 628-9. They are codified as Mo. REv.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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The Missouri videotaping provision, as embodied in the Child Victim
Witness Protection Law, 23 was reviewed by a 1986 comment in the MissouRI
LAW REvmw2 and will not be discussed here. Nor will the competency
provisions adopted in the 1985 act be discussed. This Note will deal solely
with the hearsay provision of the 1985 Missouri act.
THE MIssoURI HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted 25 Hearsay statements are considered unreliable and are
inadmissible at trial because they pose problems of perception, memory,
articulation, and sincerity, Furthermore, the jury has no opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the hearsay declarant and the declarant is not

subject to cross-examination by the opposing party.26 Prior to the enactment

of Missouri's new hearsay provision 27, the prosecutor who desired to get
the out-of-court statement of the child sex abuse victim into evidence at
trial had to rely on traditional hearsay exceptions. On occasion, it Was
possible to get such statements into evidence under the "excited utterance"
or "present sense impression" hearsay exceptions. Conceivably, such evidence might also be admitted under the so-called "residual" hearsay exception embodied in the FEDERAL RUiLES OF EVIDENcE at Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5).21
In order to examine the current state of the law regarding admissibility
of hearsay in child sex abuse cases, it is useful to examine the facts of
State v. Wright.2 9 In doing so, this Note will consider the admissibility of
the victim's out-of-court statements in Wright under traditional hearsay
exceptions, the residual exception, and the hearsay exception for child sex
abuse victims created by the 1985 act.
In Wright,0 the victim, a six-year-old girl, was outside playing with
her little brother and C.B., the son of her mother's live-in fiancee.3 The
defendant allegedly approached the little girl and asked C.B. if he could

§ 491.060(2) (1988) (competency provision); Mo. REv. STAT, § 491.075 (1988)
(hearsay exception); and Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.675-.705 (1988) (Missouri Child
Victim Witness Protection Law-allows videotaped testimony).
STAT.

23.
24.

Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.675-.705 (Supp. 1988).
Comment, Abandoning Trial By Ordeal: Missouri's New Videotaping

Statute, 51 Mo. L. REv. 515 (1986).
25. E. CLEARY, McCoRMcIC ON EviDENCE, § 246 (1984).
26. Id. § 245.
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.075 (1986).
28. Missouri has no equivalent "residual" provision to the Federal provision

codified at FED.R.Evm. 803(24).
29. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 50.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/7
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"have" her.3 2 Despite C.B.'s protests, the defendant allegedly took the
victim down an alley and into a basement where he first manually sodomized
and then later raped the little girl.33 While this was happening, C.B. notified
his father and the victim's mother; they called the police and, in the course
of searching for the girl, came upon the defendant leading her away by
the hand.14 Upon seeing her mother, the victim, who, according to her
mother, looked "shocked, upset, scared [and] frightened," 35 exclaimed that
she had been raped by the defendant.3 6 C.B.'s father held the defendant
until the police arrived.3 7 Later that same evening, in the course of the
police investigation, police detective Paula Phelan interviewed the victim
in a room specially-equipped with a hidden videotape camera. 3 Because
the victim testified at trial, the videotapes themselves were not offered as
evidence and were not a matter of controversy in the appeal. 39 Consequently,
the propriety of the trial court's admission of the hearsay was the only
matter on appeal.
Two statements made in the course of the alleged incident were introduced at trial in spite of their hearsay nature. The first of these was
the victim's statement to her mother that she had been raped. 40 The second
hearsay statement was officer Phelan's testimony regarding what the victim
said to her during the course of the videotaped interview. 41 Officer Phelan,
who had expertise in the police Sex Crimes Unit, 42 interviewed the victim
and the other children in "a special interview room designed to be com43
fortable and calming."
Under traditional hearsay rules, the initial statement of the victim to
her mother saying she had been raped might be admissible under either
the "present sense impression" hearsay exception 44 or the "excited utter-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

(d.
Brief for Respondent at 3-4, State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1988).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wright, 751 S.W.2d at 50.
Id. at 50-51.
Brief for Respondent at 4, State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1988)

(The statement was testified to at trial by the mother).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Wright, 751 S.W.2d at 52.
44. Missouri's position on the "present sense impression" exception to the
hearsay rule relies on the wider "res gestae" exception to the hearsay rule for
analysis. See, e.g., State v. Pflugradt, 463 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971),
Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during,

or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances
are such that the statements made were a spontaneous reaction or utterance

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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ance" hearsay exception. 45 The gist of both of these traditional hearsay
exceptions is to allow into evidence testimony about out-of-court statements
which are made while the declarant was still under the influence of the
event in question. The statement may be made while the declarant was
experiencing or perceiving the event as in the "present sense impression"
exception," or at a time "contemporaneous" with the event while the
declarant is still "under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition" as in the "excited utterance" exception. 47 The rationale is that
statements made "in the heat of the moment" allow the declarant no time
to reflect on the situation and to concoct a false or unreliable statement.
The other hearsay dangers of memory, perception, and articulation are
also reduced because the statements are made so close to the time of the
actual event.
Because the present sense impression exception is meant to cover contemporaneous statements made while the declarant was experiencing the
relevant event, the courts have been reluctant to extend it very far away
in time from the perceived event. Consequently, in Wright, the victim's
statement to her mother would probably not be admissible if the court
determined it to be too remote in time from the event. Generally, the
victim or declarant must say something within a period of about fifteen
minutes after the perceived event for the statement to be admissible as a
present sense impression. 48 Because the victim's statement in Wright followed
the occurrence by an undetermined period, it is unclear whether it could
come in under the "present sense impression" exception.

inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was not opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
Pflugradt, 463 S.W.2d at 572 (quoting WELARTEN Csui Rf.AL EVIDENCE, § 279 (12th
ed. 1955)).
For a detailed discussion, see also W. KNox, M. BERGER & R. DUNCAN, MISSOUI
CRUMNAL PRACTICE AiND PROCEDURE, § 450 (1985). The federal position is as
follows: "The following [is] not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: (1) Present Sense Impression. A statement
describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
45. The Missouri position on the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay
rule is again reflected by the "res gestae" approach. See, e.g., Pflugradt, 463
S.W.2d at 572. The federal position is as follows: "Excited Utterance. A statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." FED. R. Evm. 803(2).
46. For a discussion, see CLEARY, supra note 25, §§ 288-98.
47. CLEARY, supra note 25, § 297.
48. Missouri's position is that the statement must come "immediately after"
the event. Pflugradt, 463 S.W.2d at 572. See also Graham, The Confrontation
Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the
Relationship, 72 MIN. L. REv. 523, 526 n.11 (1988). For a full discussion of the
temporal limits on the "present sense impression" exception to the hearsay rule,
see CLEARY, supra note 25, § 298.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/7
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Probably, however, because the victim's mother described her as appearing "shocked, upset, scared [and] frightened," 49 her first statement
would be allowed under the "excited utterance" exception. The statement
appears to have been made in a spontaneous fashion by the child while
still under the stress of the alleged occurrence.
It is clear that neither the "present sense impression" or "excited
utterance" hearsay exceptions would allow admission of the statements

made to Officer Phelan during her interview of the children. Those statements were made at a time too far removed from the actual incident to
be admissible.
This review of the facts in Wright serves to illustrate the difficulty
prosecutors of child sex abuse cases may have in admitting critical hearsay
evidence at trial. The admissibility of such evidence under the traditional
hearsay exceptions depends upon the declarant's statement being made close
in time to the abusive event. This is not always the case, and many
otherwise reliable out-of-court statements might be excluded under the
traditional rules.5 0 Where the child cannot testify, the inadmissibility of
hearsay evidence may prove fatal to the prosecution's case.
Under Federal Rules, the so-called "residual" exception to the hearsay
rule5' may also be used to admit the out-of-court statements of child abuse
victims into evidence. However, it, too, is of limited use. Under the
"residual" exception, out-of-court statements with some level of reliability
are allowed into evidence when justice requires. The "residual" exception,
however, was never intended to open up new hearsay exceptions. Rather,

49. Brief for Respondent at 4, State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1988).
50. Often, considerable time may elapse between the abusive event and the
child's out-of-court statement concerning the event. FONTANA, supra note 9, at 9.
Both of the hearsay exceptions mentioned in the text "excited utterance" and
"present sense impression" assume the statement is made concurrent with or shortly
following the event in question. CLEARY, supra note 25, §§ 297-98.
51. The FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE created the "residual" exception at
FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).

Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered
as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered that any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention
to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
FED. R. Evm. 803(24). FED. R. Evm. 804(B)(5) is identical to FED. R. Evm.
803(24).
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it was intended to be a sUpplement to the traditional exceptions.32 Consequently, its use has been restricted and does not solve the problem for
the prosecutor of a child sex abuse case.

In Wright, the court admitted the hearsay evidence under Missouri's
statutory hearsay exception for statements made by the child victim of
sexual abuse." The new statutory hearsay exception is philosophically cut
from the same cloth as the more traditional hearsay exceptions because,
essentially, it determines the statements of young children regarding sexual
abuse to have a high degree of reliability.54 Thus, a hearsay exception
applying to child victims of sexual abuse is a rational extension of existing
hearsay doctrine because it remains true to the standard of reliability as
the fundamental rationale behind hearsay exceptions.
The adoption of hearsay exception statutes for child sex abuse cases
also represents a strong public policy statement that child sexual abuse will

52. See CLEARY, supra note 25, § 324.1.
58. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 491.075 (1986). The statute reads as follows:
1. A statement made by a child under the age of twelve relating to an
offense under chapter 565, 566, or 568, RSMo, performed with or on a
child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is
admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings in the courts of this state
as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if:
(I) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of
the jury that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either;
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness.
2. Notwithstanding subsection 1 of this section or any provision of law
or rule of evidence requiring corroboration of statements, admissions, or
confessions of the defendant, and notwithstanding any prohibition of
hearsay evidence, a statement by a child when under the age of twelve
who is alleged to be a victim of an offense under chapter 565, 566, or
568, RSMo, is sufficient corroboration of a statement, admission, or
confession regardless of whether or not the child is available to testify
regarding the offense.
3. [requires prosecuting attorney to notify defense counsel of his intent
to offer such a statement in evidence].
4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the admissibility of
statements, admissions or confessions otherwise admissible by law.
Mo. Rv. STAT. § 491.075 (1986).
54. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1749. McGrath and Clements note that
reliability may be inherent in the stories told by children who have been sexually
abused. "[O]ur experience and the literature support the proposition that children's
statements about sexual matters are inherently reliable because very young children
without actual sexual experience are unable to lie or fantasize about sexual experiences, especially in the explicit detail in which they often describe what has
happened to them." McGrath and Clemens, supra note 18, at 240.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/7
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not to be tolerated. Such statutes have become widespread" and Missouri's
statute is largely identical to the ground-breaking statute of the State of
Washington, adopted in 1982.56 Because any new hearsay rule which affects
criminal defendants poses sixth amendment confrontation clause questions,
legislators who wished to see the new exception prevail had to take care
that they draft the new statute carefully.
CONFRONTATION

CLAUSE IMPLICATIONS

The sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article I,

§ 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution, guarantees to a criminal defendant
the right "to meet the witnesses against him face to face." 57 Although the
constitutional right of confrontation might at first glance seem to be a

codification of the hearsay rule, the courts have never interpreted it as
such. 8 Certain types of hearsay testimony were allowed at common law
and the traditional hearsay exceptions were in existence at the time of the
enactment of the sixth amendment. Most commentators believe the framers
of the Sixth Amendment intended to leave these hearsay exceptions intact.5 9
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court has been regularly called upon to

define the exact protections given to defendants by the sixth amendment.
The court has found the chief protections afforded by the confrontation
clause to be the defendant's right to cross-examine opposing witnesses and
the requirement that the prosecution show hearsay declarants to be effec0
tively unavailable before their hearsay statements will be admitted at trialA
In Ohio v. Roberts,6 1 the U.S. Supreme Court set out a two-prong
test to insure that the right to confrontation is protected. Before any
hearsay testimony can be admitted, the court requires that, first, the
prosecution show at trial that the hearsay declarant is unavailable despite

"good faith" efforts to attain his appearance in court.6 Second, the court

requires that the prosecution also show the statement to have some as-

certainable "indicia of reliability.

'6 3

The reliability of a hearsay statement

may be established if, by its nature, it falls into what the court terms a

55. See supra note 20 for a list of states having hearsay exception statutes.
The list at note 20 does not include other states which have adopted similar
procedures by case law.
56. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A-44-120 (1982).
57. Mo. CONSr. oF 1945, art. I, § 18(a) (1985). The federal version, found
at U.S. CONSr., amend. VI, reads as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him
...
." U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
58. CLEARY, supra note 25, § 252.
59. Id. § 252, at 750.
60. Id. § 252, at 751. Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
61. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
62. Id.at 74.
63. Id.at 66.
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Otherwise, the proponent of the state-

ment must establish its reliability by showing that other "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" inure to the statement.6 5 Whether the emotional stress placed on a child by testifying at a sexual abuse trial would
be sufficient- to make him "unavailable" for the purposes of the confrontation clause is uncertain. The Missouri Supreme Court did not directly
address that question in Wright. 6
The Wright court did, however, specifically uphold the constitutionality
of the Missouri hearsay statute on the grounds that it satisfied the requirements of the confrontation clause:
The language of § 491.075 mirrors those constitutional parameters [set out
in Ohio v. Roberts] by requiring a showing that the "time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability" and
that the child either testify at the proceedings or be unavailable as a
witness; thus the statute comports with the Confrontation Clause requirements described in Roberts and is not facially invalid.67

EQUAL PROTECTION IMPLICATIONS
Wright also asserted on appeal that it was error for the trial court to
admit Phelan's statements because the statute denied him equal protection

under the law. Wright argued that the statute placed him, as an accused
sex offender, in a "suspect class" and thereby denied his right to confront
the witnesses against him-a right not denied to other criminal defendants.6
Because a statutory scheme which "operates to the disadvantage of a

64.

Id.

65. Id.
66. In Wright, the child victim did testify at the trial, so the Supreme Court
did not decide the specific question posed by a hypothetical situation where the
child is deemed "unavailable" and does not in fact testify.
[The statute comports with the Confrontation Clause requirements described in Roberts and is not facially invalid. Further, we find no constitutional infirmity in its application in this case. The child testified at
trial and was subjected to cross-examination, and the court conducted a
careful and thorough hearing from which it concluded that the statements
contained sufficient indicia of reliability.
Wright, 751 S.W.2d at 52.
Other states have dealt with the constitutional problems which occur when the
child is unavailable. See State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 089, 688 P.2d 538 (1984);
People v. Hise, 738 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (There were two victims. One
did not testify due to a speech defect. The court deemed this to make him
"unavailable" for constitutional purposes.); State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.
App. 1986) (Two victims; one did not testify because deemed "unavailable for
constitutional purposes" by the court.). However, the author is not aware of a
case holding a child to be "unavailable" due to the trauma of testifying.
67. Id. at 52. See also supra note 53 (the Missouri hearsay provision).
68. Brief for Appellant at 21, State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/7
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suspect class . .. receives strict scrutiny to determine whether the classi-

fication is necessary to a compelling state interest,' '69 Wright further argued
that the hearsay statute should receive such strict scrutiny and be over-

turned. 70 The court noted that it had discussed the rationale for equal
71
protection inquiries at great length in an earlier case, State v. Williams,
which was also a case of child sex abuse. In Williams, the court held that
"in equal protection claims, the first step is to ascertain whether the statutory
scheme 'operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Consti-

tution.' ' 72 The court in Williams narrowly construed the meaning of "suspect class" to refer to "inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion
or alienage, ' 71 and found that the defendant was not a member of such
a "suspect class." 74 The defendant also asserted his equal protection rights
were violated because the statute deprives him of his "fundamental right"
to confront the witnesses against him. 75 The court in Wright did not decide
whether the right of confrontation was such a "fundamental right" for
equal protection considerations,76 because, as the court stated, "[w]e need
not decide whether the right of confrontation is one of those implicitly
recognized as fundamental for the purposes of equal protection analysis,
[citation to Williams omitted], because the statute here does not deny
defendant the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause. ' 77 In other
words, the court struck down two birds with one stone by disposing of
the confrontation clause and equal protection arguments in one fell swoop.
CONCLUSION

In State v. Wright, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Missouri hearsay exception over challenges based on both
the sixth amendment confrontation clause right and the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.
It is important to recognize that the victim in Wright testified at the
trial and the court left unanswered the question of whether the hearsay

69.
70.

Wright, 751 S.W.2d at 51.
Id.

71. State v. Williams, 729 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. 1987).
72. Id. at 200 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).

73.
74.
75.

Id. at 201 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
Id.
Brief for Appellant at pp. 18-24, State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48 (Mo.

1988).
76. The U.S. Supreme Court first required that where a statute "infringes
upon a fundamental right," the state must show that the statute was necessary to
the accomplishment of some compelling state interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155 (1973).
77. Wright, 751 S.W.2d at 51.
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statements of an unavailable witness in a child sex abuse case will be
allowed into evidence. Due to the undoubted trauma experienced in many
cases by a child who must literally come face-to-face with the defendant,
it is likely that we shall soon see another case along the lines of Wright
where the child does not testify. Missouri's statute is nearly identical to
the statutory hearsay exceptions for child victims of sexual abuse in Washington and Minnesota." Both Washington and Minnesota, among other
states, have dealt with the confrontation problems posed by the unavailability of the child declarant 09 Each has upheld the statute's constitutionality
so long as the in camera hearing prior to trial produces sufficient "indicia
of reliability" based on the statutory language requiring an examination
of the "time, content, and circumstances" of the statement. 0 Because the

78. WASH. REV.
595.02(3) (1988).

CODE ANN. tit.

9A § 44.120 (1988);

MINN. STAT. ANN. §

79. See infra note 80.

80. Mo. REv.

STAT.

§ 491.075 (1986). Washington has, perhaps, the longest

experience with a child sex assault hearsay provision. Several decisions regarding
it are of note. In State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984), a two

and a half-year-old child had been molested, and by the time of trial, the child
could not adequately remember the incident and was deemed "unavailable" by the
court. Slider, 38 Wash. App. at 693-94, 688 P.2d at 541. The trial court's careful
adherence to the pre-trial hearing on indicia of reliability established sufficient
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to enable the child's hearsay statement

into evidence even though the child was unavailable at trial. Slider, 38 Wash. App.
at 696, 688 P.2d at 543. In State v. Justiniano, 48 Wash. App. 572, 740 P.2d
872 (1987), the court held that the child had been competent when making a
previous out-of-court statement, even though the child was deemed "unable to
express in words the memory of the occurrence, and (was] thus unable to testify
at trial .. . ." Justiniano, 48 Wash. App. at 574, 740 P.2d at 874. The court

noted that "the focus of the determination of competency should be on the
competency to make the challenged statement," not the competency of the child
to testify in open court. Justiniano, 48 Wash. App. at 577, 740 P.2d at 875. The
unavailability of the child did not a violate the defendant's confrontation rights
since the court had established "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" by
adhering to the statutory preliminary hearing for indicia of reliability. Justiniano,
48 Wash. App. at 582, 740 P.2d at 878. However, in State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.
2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984), the court overturned the conviction because the
prosecution did not adequately establish the unavailability of the child declarant.
Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197.
Minnesota's experience has been similar. In State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308

(Minn. App. 1986), only one of two child victims was deemed competent and

available to testify. Because the state had made a "good faith effort" to produce

both witnesses by producing them at the preliminary hearing, the unavailability
requirement was met. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 314. To determine the reliability of
the out-of-court statements, the court looked to time, content, and circumstances

of the statements and determined they possessed sufficient indicia of reliability.
Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d at 312-13. Additionally, the appellate court found no violation
of the confrontation clause. The court in State v. Carver, 380 N.W.2d 821 (Minn.
App. 1986) rev'd on other grounds, 390 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), noted
that "[w]hen a child is available as a witness, the trial court may admit his or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/7
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Missouri statute was carefully drafted to fall well within the rule outlined
1
in Ohio v. Roberts,"
and because it is so similar to the Washington and
Minnesota statutes, it is probable that a Missouri court would uphold its
constitutionality even where the child declarant is unavailable.
The due process concerns raised by the defendant in Wright were also
raised in Williams and have now been dealt with by the court in two
situations involving child sex abuse defendants. 2 It is unlikely this will
prove a fruitful avenue of appeal in future cases.
In the end, the most important aspect of the court's decision in Wright
may simply be that it has ratified the will of the legislature and given
Missouri prosecutors a new and constitutionally effective device for prosecuting child sex abuse offenders.
THoyAs P. Dvoiux

her hearsay statements if it finds that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement and the reliability of the person to whom the statement is made provide
'sufficient indicia of reliability."' Carver, 380 N.W.2d at 825 (quoting MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02(3)(a) (West 1988)). This is required by the Minnesota statute when
the child is unavailable and, further, it requires corroboration of the statement by
other evidence. Carver, 380 N.W.2d at 826. In this respect, the Minnesota statute
differs from both the Washington and Missouri statutes.
81. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56.
82. The Utah courts have also dealt with the equal protection argument
against the Utah hearsay exception which is codified at UTAH CODE, ANN. § 765-411 (Supp. 1988). See State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426 (Utah 1987).
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